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Abstract Many linguist have claimed that must’s meaning is weaker than epistemic
necessity—a claim dubbed “the Mantra” in an influential recent paper by von Fintel
& Gillies (2008). von Fintel & Gillies argue that the Mantra is false, and that the
intuitions that have driven it can be accounted for by appealing to evidential meaning:
must requires that the proposition it embeds is true and maximally certain, but also
known only by indirect means. I show that von Fintel & Gillies do not provide a
compelling argument against the Mantra, and that their theory of evidential meaning,
while promising in certain respects, also has serious empirical and conceptual
problems. In addition, a variety of corpus examples indicate that speakers who assert
must p are not always maximally confident in the truth of p. As an alternative, I
re-implement von Fintel & Gillies’ theory of indirect evidentiality in a probabilistic,
Mantra-compatible framework. Ultimately, both sides of the debate are partly right:
must is weak in several respects, but it also encodes an indirect evidential meaning.
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1 Introduction
There is a Mantra, for decades repeated mindlessly by researchers in modal seman-
tics: “Must is weak”. So argue von Fintel & Gillies (2010) in reference to a line of
thought going back to Karttunen (1972), who writes:
There is a striking difference between the logical necessity operator
and words like must. Consider the two expressions in (1) and (2):
(1) John must have left. (2) John has left.
In any of the standard modal logics, ◻p is a stronger expression
than p. However, there is an inverse relation between [these] two
sentences ... In stating (1), the speaker indicates that he has no
first-hand evidence about John’s departure, and neither has it been
reported to him by trustworthy sources. Instead, (1) seems to say that
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the truth of John has left in some way logically follows from other
facts the speaker knows and some reasonable assumptions that he
is willing to entertain. A man who has seen John leave or has read
about it in the newspaper would not ordinarily assert (1), since he is
in the position to make the stronger claim in (2).1
As von Fintel & Gillies (2010, henceforth “vFG”) note, many other linguists
have repeated this claim in various forms. Kratzer (1991) formalizes the weakness
intuition by making must, in effect, a quantifier over a maximally normal subset of
the epistemically possible worlds (E); thus must p is compatible with there being¬p-worlds in E as long as they are not maximally normal. This idea has been used
in many domains. For example, Giannakidou (1999) uses this feature to explain why
certain NPIs are licensed by Greek counterpart of must in its deontic and epistemic
interpretation—though, crucially, not in its alethic interpretation.
However, as Palmer (1979: 59) points out, the intutions supporting the “weak-
ness” claim are confounded with indirectness of evidence. Indeed Karttunen hints at
this—“... no first-hand evidence about John’s departure ...” (my emphasis) —but
Palmer’s diagnosis is more explicit: “It is the notion of deduction or inference from
known facts that is the essential feature of must, not just the strength of commitment
by the speaker.” vFG agree but go further, arguing that must p conveys indirectness
of evidence but does not convey weakness of any kind: it is false if any ¬p-worlds
are epistemically possible. They marshal an impressive variety of arguments for the
“strength” claim, adding a very interesting novel formalization of indirect evidential
meaning which supports the claimed orthogonality of indirectness and weakness.
To illustrate the empirical import of this debate, consider some examples of must
from the message boards of the genealogy website Ancestry.com.
(3) I have learned that Flora & Dr Alexander had also a brother Dr Murdock
MacLeod & a sister Margaret. Margaret married Kenneth MacLeod of Ebost
on the Isle of Skye. Must have been about 1820.
(4) My great grandfather John HARTMAN married a lady by the name of
Margaret KESSLER. John died in Colorado 1 Oct 1896. His wife was not in
his will so must have died before that time. ... Does anybody know anything
about this couple?
In (3), the example seems to convey that the conclusion marked by must was made on
the basis of fragmentary historical records, and not, for example, an explicit report in
an authoritative history book. In (4), the evidence is explicitly specified: the author
infers that the wife must have died before the husband did on the ground that she
1 Karttunen 1972: 11-12. I’ve changed example numbering, and updated notation for the necessity
operator from ‘L’ to the now more common ‘◻’.
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was not in his will. Ancestry.com users frequently provide an explicit specification
of the evidence used to arrive at a must conclusion (see Stone 1994).
Is must “weak” or “strong” in these examples? We can ask this question in
several different strength-related questions about this example. First, is it plausible
that the author of (4), who explicitly acknowledges having very little evidence
relevant to the conclusion drawn, is maximally confident in the truth of The wife
died before that time? Second, is it plausible that the author intends, by marking this
proposition with must, to convey maximal confidence in its truth? Third, does the
truth of the author’s must-statement depend on whether, hidden in the mists of time,
the wife’s absence in the will had a different explanation (say, a marital split)? Or
does it depend only on whether the inference that she had died is a compelling one,
given the evidence that is available to the author?
As this discussion suggests, the “strength” vs. “weakness” issue should be
separated into several components—by my count, at least three distinct questions.
• Pragmatic strength: To what extent does a speaker who asserts must p take
on a commitment to the truth of p? Relatedly, to what extent is someone
who asserts must p blameworthy if p turns out to be false?
• Semantic strength 1 (doxastic status): What does must p entail about the
status of p in E , and/or about its probability? For example, does must p entail
It is absolutely certain that p (or It is almost certain, likely, ...)?
• Semantic strength 2 (veridicity): Does must p entail p?
vFG argue that must is strong on all three dimensions: must p entails p; it entails
maximal confidence in p (i.e., p is absolutely certain); and a speaker who uses it
is maximally committed to the truth of p, for example, in that she is blameworthy
if p subsequently turns out to be false. In this paper I argue that the Mantra is
basically right: must is not maximal in either the doxastic or pragmatic senses.
Cooperative speakers frequently use must to mark propositions that they are not
maximally certain of, and of which they do not intend to take on a maximally
strong pragmatic commitment. Examples (3) and (4) already make a strong case
for these claims, since the authors of these texts do not appear to be maximally
committed to the truth of the conclusions that they are describing. On the veridicity
question, I do not take a strong stand in this paper due to the difficulty of getting
clear truth-value judgments about must statements (von Fintel & Gillies 2008; Yalcin
2011; MacFarlane 2014). However, I will suggest below that vFG’s arguments for
veridicity are not compelling.
In section 4 I propose a hybrid theory which treats (in)directness of evidence and
degrees of confidence separately. This theory builds conceptually on vFG’s account,
but combines it with a probabilistic formalism which is better suited for modeling
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induction than vFG’s deductive approach. This framework allows us to capture the
best of Karttunen’s and vFG’s insights by treating must as both indirect and weak.
2 vFG’s arguments against weakness
In this and the following section I respond to vFG’s many-pronged assault. None of
these arguments provide compelling reason to reject the Mantra, though some are
convincing as applied to weak theories that do not also encode indirectness.
2.1 Argument 1: must is not always weak
vFG emphasize the distinction between indirectness and weakness: conclusions
derived from indirect evidence can be maximally strong, and must can be used to
signal indirectness without even hinting at uncertainty—for instance, in proofs.
(5) x is prime. x is even. x must equal 2.
To my knowledge, though, no “Mantrista” has claimed that must entails a lack of
certainty. For example, Kratzer (1991) treats must p as true whenever p is true in all
maximally normal worlds in E—but is silent on p’s status in non-maximal worlds.
We can, however, extract a related argument against a Kratzer-style weak theory.
Suppose that must p entails only that p is true in the maximally normal worlds in E .
Then, if English has some expression which denotes universal quantification over E ,
must p should be associated with a quantity implicature to the effect that p is not
true in all of the worlds in E . Suppose that certainly is such an expression. Then
(6a) should arise sometimes (though by no means always), just like (6b).
(6) a. It must be raining. ↝ It’s not certainly raining.
b. All of my graduate students are happy. ↝ Not all of my students are happy.
If this is a good theory of certainly, the absence of an implicature may be a problem
for Kratzer’s theory: we do not infer from the speaker’s failure to conclude (5) with
x certainly equals 2 that the speaker is unsure about basic arithmetical facts. If
this argument is convincing, then, must cannot be merely a non-maximal epistemic
modal.
However, the argument from implicature does not apply to a theory which
combines weakness with an evidential component. The problem would return if
there were a word certainly′ expressing indirectness and universal quantification
over E ; but the only plausible candidate is must itself on vFG’s analysis. Since the
existence of such an item is exactly what is in dispute, the occasional lack of an
inference to lowered confidence tells us nothing.
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On the hybrid analysis described below, English allows us to express maximal
confidence (using certainly) or high-but-not-necessarily-maximal confidence with an
evidential signal (using must). A speaker’s choice to employ must could be explained
by a desire to emphasize indirectness of evidence, even under full confidence.
2.2 Argument 2: must is never weak
vFG give a number of subarguments which target, variously, veridicity, doxastic
strength, and degree of pragmatic commitment. None of these arguments gives us a
strong reason to reject the Mantra in its most general form.
Subargument 1: Inferencing. Consider the following argument:
(7) “If p, must q. p. Therefore, q.”
This feels like a pretty good argument. According to vFG, the intuition that it is
provides powerful evidence for one plank of their account, namely, the veridicity of
must. The reason is that, if must p did not entail p, the argument would be logically
invalid. For example, on Kratzer’s (1991) semantics, If p, must q is true as long as q
is true in all of the maximally normal worlds in E ∩ p. But the actual world might be
non-maximal, and so the fact that p is true there is consistent with ¬q being true in
the actual world as well.
The argument goes through, but it relies on a questionable background theory of
intuitive reasoning: that argument strength intuitions are directly related to deductive
validity, and that an argument that is not deductively valid should be perceived as
weak. This is a traditional position, and has been argued for prominently in cognitive
psychology by Rips (1994). On a theory of this type, we expect gut feelings of
argument strength to come in three discrete flavors—“valid”, “invalid but consistent”,
and “inconsistent”—and the distribution of these intuitions should track deductive
logic except when people are making reasoning errors.
This position has largely been abandoned in psychology, however. Even Rips
(2002) has subsequently abandoned the “imperialist” project of using deductive
logic to account for all intuitive reasoning, arguing that we need gradient measures
of inductive strength, in addition to deductive validity, in order to account for the
full range of argument strength judgments. The best available theory at present
is that inductive strength is closely related (perhaps identical) to the conditional
probability of a conclusion given the premises (Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez &
Shafir 1990; Oaksford & Chater 2001, 2007; Over 2009; Lassiter & Goodman 2015).
On this analysis, if the conditional probability of the conclusion given the premises
is high, the argument is felt as strong; if it is low, it is felt as weak. Deductive
logic remains relevant, since deductively valid arguments are maximally strong
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(conditional probability 1) and conclusions which contradict their premises are
maximally weak (conditional probability 0). However, it is possible for an argument
to be very strong without being deductively valid, if the conditional probability of its
conclusion given its premises is close to 1.
On the hybrid, probabilistic theory to be proposed below, the conclusion of (7) is
guaranteed to have high probability on the assumption that the premises are true.
The first premise requires (inter alia) that P(q∣p) is high, and the second that p is
true. Combining these two sources of information, we find that P(q) is high, and
so the argument is felt as strong.2 In general, once we have given up the incorrect
assumption that argument strength intuitions give us a direct line into deductive
validity, there are many possible semantic proposals that could guarantee (7) to be
intuitively strong, without making must veridical or doxastically maximal.
Subargument 2: Must and weak necessity operators. A second attempt to show
that must is (doxastically) strong involves the observation that (8) is contradictory.
(8) #It must be raining, but perhaps it is not raining.
If perhaps expresses existential quantification over E , this is unexpected according to
the Mantra, since must p does not exclude the presence of ¬p-worlds in E . However,
if must expresses universal quantification over E , the infelicity of (8) is expected.
Unfortunately, this argument misses the target completely. Weak theories, as a
rule, deny vFG’s assumption that perhaps (might, maybe, possible, etc.) expresses
existential quantification over E . Instead they treat perhaps as must’s dual: perhaps
p ≡ ¬must¬p. On this assumption, (8) is ruled out as infelicitous no matter what
must means, since it expresses the conjunction of must p and ¬must p.
vFG acknowledge this point briefly in a footnote, responding as follows: “There
are strong necessity epistemic modals. So pick one and take its dual (e.g., there
is a vanishingly small chance that). It’ll be horrible when paired with must in
examples like [(8)], we promise” (p.365, fn. 25). In fact it is not too difficult to locate
naturally-occurring examples which have more or less this form: here are a few.
(9) There’s one missing pepper on the ground a few feet away. A closer look
reveals it has been chewed by something. I wouldn’t put it past that pesky
blue jay to have teeth but then I think it is unlikely he does. It must be a
squirrel. What else can get onto a second floor balcony?
The author of the blog post quoted in (9) has pretty shaky ornithological credentials,
but their status as an expert speaker of English is not in doubt. This author uses must
to mark the proposition It is a squirrel that chewed the pepper, which contradicts a
2 I am skirting over important issues about how precisely the information in the conditional premise is
taken up; see, e.g., Oaksford & Chater 2007.
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proposition previously indicated to be possible but unlikely (the blue jay has teeth
and, by implication, the blue jay chewed the pepper).
While the proposition that would render (9) a direct counter-example to vFG’s
analysis is merely implicit, its counterpart in (10) is fully explicit.
(10) I refuse to believe that this one game, Lost Planet 2 DX11, which was
previously 100% stable remember, is crashing because my overclock is
unstable .... It’s not impossible, granted, but IMO it is highly unlikely. There
must be some other cause.
Here, It’s not impossible [that Lost Planet 2 DX11 is crashing because my overclock
is unstable], but it’s highly unlikely is immediately followed by There must be some
other cause. This is not compatible with vFG’s theory, but it is consistent with a
doxastically weak semantics.3
These examples indicate that vFG’s promise—that must p will be intuitively
infelicitous when conjoined with any expression hinting that ¬p is epistemically
possible—was too hasty: such conjunctions are possible and attested. What is more,
these examples directly falsify vFG’s claim that must is a universal quantifier overE , and provide strong support for the Mantra.4
Subargument 3: Distancing. Recall the distinction between three kinds of strength
from section 1: veridicity, doxastic strength, and pragmatic commitment. The con-
trast between doxastic strength and veridicity should be apparent: someone could
be maximally certain of the truth of a false sentence, or less than fully certain of a
the truth of a veridical statement. What is less clear is how pragmatic commitment
relates to either variety of semantic strength. This point is important in the current
context because many of the arguments for and against the Mantra invoke pragmatic
commitment, rather than directly targeting doxastic strength.
One such argument involves whether it is felicitous for someone who utters p,
might p, must p, etc. to distance herself from p if it turns out to be untrue. vFG argue
that such distancing is not acceptable with must, as in (11).
(11) a. Alex: It must be raining.
b. Billy: [opens curtains] No it isn’t. You were wrong.
3 Note, however, that these examples place constraints on the meanings of the other epistemic expres-
sions in this. For example, to account for (10) we must assume (quite plausibly) that p is impossible
requires a higher degree of confidence in ¬p than must ¬p does.
4 It has been suggested to me that there is some kind of modal domain shifting going on in the midst of
these examples. There is no way to exclude this possibility, but without detailed constraints on the
inclusion and exclusion of worlds from E such a theory borders on vacuity: any two constraints on
epistemic states could consistently be placed side-by-side if we allow unconstrained domain shifting.
It would, however, be very interesting to see an empirically predictive theory of this type spelled out.
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c. Alex: # I was not! Look, I didn’t say it was raining. I only said it must be
raining. Stop picking on me!
Alex’s response could, however, be appropriate with might, ought or plausible.
In vFG’s judgment, “saying I only said it must be raining is as bizarre as I only
said I ate all of the cookies. But if, as the Mantra maintains, must is not located
at the very top of the scale of epistemic strength, one would expect only and must
to combine like old friends” (von Fintel & Gillies 2010: 366). This argument is
not about veridicity: if we substitute the non-veridical I’m completely sure it’s
raining in (11), the oddness remains. Rather, the argument involves doxastic strength
(via the interaction with only) and pragmatic commitment (via intuitions of the
appropriateness of distancing).
There are various objections that one could make to the distancing argument:
the intuition that (11c) is odd is neither clear nor universal, and the “old friends”
argument assumes a simplistic picture of what only means (see Beaver & Clark
2008). But the most serious problem is that the oddness of (11c) depends on features
of this specific example. In a different context, a response along these lines could
be used appropriately to emphasize that her statement was reasonable given the
evidence available. Consider a variant of the genealogy examples given in section 1:
(12) a. Alex: John died in Colorado 1 Oct 1896. His wife was not in his will so
must have died before that time.
b. Billy [consults her private archive, which no one else knows about]: No
she hadn’t—you had not consulted a detailed source on their lives which
you didn’t know about, and which only I have access to. She left him in
1893, and was living in New Orleans on that date. You were wrong.
c. Alex: I was not! Look, I didn’t say she had died—I had no way to
know that for sure. I only said she must have died, and that was a totally
reasonable conclusion given what was available to me.
Unlike (11c), Alex’s response in (12c) seems reasonable. I suspect that the
difference in felicity between (11) and (12) involves whether it would have been
easy for the speaker to access evidence that would be decisive about the truth of the
embedded sentence (see Hacking 1967; DeRose 1991). In (11), where Alex could
easily have resolved the question by opening the curtains, it seems appropriate for
Billy to blame her for making a mistake, and odd for her to refuse to accept blame.
But when it would have been difficult or impossible for the Alex to access decisive
evidence, I only said must p can be used to convey that Billy’s attempt to assign
blame is unreasonable: “Based on what was available at the time, I asserted—quite
reasonably—that the evidence strongly favored the conclusion that p”.
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2.3 Argument 3: A strong semantics makes available an attractive account
of evidential meaning.
As noted above, several earlier authors indicate a connection between must and
reasoning from indirect evidence (Karttunen 1972; Palmer 1979). However, vFG
seem to be the first to suggest that the only relevant factor is (in)directness, and
that strength of commitment is irrelevant to the meaning of must. To reinforce this
claim, vFG propose a positive account on which must is a universal quantifier overE , which also encodes a presupposition of indirect evidence. Part of the attraction
of the theory is that it encodes must’s requirement of indirect evidence in a way
that is consistent with its veridicity and maximal doxastic and pragmatic strength.
However, this positive theory encounters both empirical and conceptual problems.
Fortunately, these problems also point the way for an improved semantics—though
one that is compatible with the dreaded Mantra.
In vFG’s account, there is a set of propositions K (the kernel) each of which are
known through direct experience to be true. They assume that the set of epistemically
possible worlds E is the deductive closure of K, i.e., E =⋂K; this assumption makes
sense if we allow that whatever is known is known either through some kind of direct
perception or through inference from direct perception. The propositions known
indirectly, I , are those that are entailed by E but not in K:
I = {p∣E ⊆ p}−K.
Crucially, entailment is the only kind of inferencing that this account permits. vFG
then define truth-conditions for a simple epistemic must sentence:
(13) must p
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩is a presupposition failure if p ∈K (if p is known directly);otherwise, is true iff E ⊆ p (i.e., if E entails p).
This definition captures indirectness via the presupposition that p ∉K; when this
presupposition is satisfied, it asserts that p is known. As a secondary inference, if
must p is not a presupposition failure, we can infer that p ∈ I , the set of propositions
that are known indirectly. Extrapolating somewhat from vFG’s explicit discussion, it
appears that this semantics derives the three planks of their account as follows.
Doxastic maximality: First, we must assume that, when something is known,
it is believed with maximal confidence. Second, we must assume that deduction
preserves maximal confidence. On these assumptions, something that is known via
deduction from known premises is known with maximal confidence.
Maximal pragmatic strength: Asserting something that entails maximal belief
in p is inappropriate unless one is maximally committed to the truth of p.
Veridicity: “You can’t have direct information that P unless it is the case that P.
... So our modal bases will be reflexive” (von Fintel & Gillies 2010: 371).
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To illustrate the application of this semantics to a concrete case, vFG introduce
Billy, who has just seen people coming into her office with wet raincoats on. She
utters “It must be raining.” The semantics predicts that this utterance is a presuppo-
sition failure if Billy has directly observed that it is raining, and that, otherwise, it
is true just in case Billy has access to some kernel K of true and directly observed
propositions such that ⋂K entails that it’s raining. Specifically, vFG suggest that
Billy’s utterance is appropriate and true if her kernel contains at least the following:
(14) KBilly ⊇ {people are coming in with wet raincoats, people only come in
with wet raincoats when it’s raining}
The deductive closure of any such K must also include the proposition it’s raining.
The basic problem with this proposal is that it cannot cope with the frequent use
of must to report inductive inferences. In the genealogical examples in (3) and (4),
for instance, must is used to mark what look like “inferences to the best explanation”:
statements which are reasonable to believe because their truth would readily explain
the available evidence, but which are not entailed by anything known to the author.
In these examples it is difficult to even imagine a set of propositions that would
entail the truth of the statement and which the author could plausibly have observed
directly. It is also implausible to suppose that the authors have an erroneous belief
that they have access to the required set of propositions: experienced genealogists
are well-aware of the epistemic status of their inferences. (More in section 3.)
But vFG’s problems with induction are even closer to home: it should be inap-
propriate for Billy to use must even in the scenario that vFG focus on. The reason
is that Billy’s kernel crucially contains the “directly known” proposition people
only come in with wet raincoats when it’s raining. This is, of course, logically
equivalent to the negative existential People never come in with wet raincoats
when it’s not raining. How could Billy acquire direct knowledge of the truth of
this negative existential proposition? The only way to do so, it seems, would be to
actually witness all relevant situations, and check that none of them are situations in
which (a) it is not raining, and (b) someone comes in with a wet raincoat. The set of
relevant situations is presumably infinite, and so this is not possible even in principle:
no amount of experience could grant Billy direct knowledge of the non-existence of
a situation type. But then Billy’s utterance of It must be raining is false: It is raining
is not entailed by what she knows from direct experience.
This is not a minor issue that can be attributed to a poorly-chosen example.
Instead, it reveals a deep conceptual problem—and one which seems inevitable
given (a) vFG’s assumption that “inference = deduction”, and (b) the fact that must
is frequently used to report inductive and other non-trivial inferences. The kernel-
based analysis of the evidential component of must is too restrictive to deal with this
example, or—as we see in section 3—with other, more naturalistic uses of must.
10
Weakness of must
3 Analysis of naturalistic examples
This section discusses a number of additional corpus-derived examples of epistemic
must. These illustrate additional empirical problems for vFG’s account, but also, on
the positive side, point toward features that a successful theory of must must have.
Lack of knowledge or direct evidence. Like (3) and (4), the examples to follow
were collected from genealogical discussions which are largely devoted to specula-
tion about the lives of unknown, long-dead persons. These discussions attempt to
piece together details and dates of births, deaths, marriages, and migrations, on the
basis of fragmentary historical records, general reasoning, and hearsay. The authors
frequently use must to mark inferences which have been made in this fashion. The
equation must = known by deduction from direct observation does not do them
justice: genealogists and other historians frequently use must p despite clearly being
aware that they do not know anything that entails p. Consider (15), taken from The
Plymouth Colony Archive Project’s discussion of the fates of Mayflower passengers.
(15) Goodman, John. "Died soon after arrival in the general sickness," ... Good-
man was still alive in mid-January 1621 ... , although not in good physical
shape. He is listed as one of those who received land in 1623 ... He is not
listed among those who were part of the cattle division of 1627, so he must
have died by then.
For vFG to account for this example, K would have to include something like The
only way that a farmer who arrived on the Mayflower in 1620, is reported to
have died “soon” afterwards, was sick in 1621, and was reported to be alive in
1623, could fail to be in a list of farmers in 1627 is that he died in the meantime.
No one could seriously self-ascribe knowledge of this proposition, direct or other-
wise. Alternatively, we could suppose that the authors are uncooperative or flouting
conversational norms for pragmatic effect; but neither explanation is plausible here.
A better diagnosis is that the semantic account under consideration is incorrect.
These authors are not trying to express maximal confidence in the truth of Goodman
had died by 1627, nor to take on a maximal commitment to this proposition. Instead,
(15) presents Goodman’s death as the best explanation of the evidence presented.
This is indeed a good explanation, and it is rendered highly probable by what is
reported; but it is in no way entailed by this evidence.5
5 It gets worse. It is well-known among genealogists that the sources on which they rely are often
unreliable (Mills 1999). If vFG’s semantics were correct, we would expect that competent genealogists
would almost never use must; and that we, knowing about the possible unreliability of sources, would
perceive most instances of must in this context as infelicitous. But epistemic must is quite frequent in
genealogical discussions, and seems to be a natural way to report best-guesses about past events.
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More examples like this could easily be adduced. Indeed, similar lessons emerge
from the two genealogical examples that we saw in section 1. For instance, example
(4)—His wife was not in his will so must have died before that time—invokes a line
of reasoning which is plausible, but which could hardly be said to be foolproof.
Again, we would have to be quite uncharitable to the author in order to explain the
use of must here if vFG’s account were correct—supposing that the author does not
realize that marriages can end for reasons other than death.
Explicit disavowal of direct evidence. A clear reason to doubt that entailment
from direct evidence is a requirement of must is that speakers sometimes use must p
while specifically denying possession of direct evidence for p.
(16) Almost certainly the site must have been inhabited well before that time, but
in a place where virtually every square inch of land has been built and rebuilt
upon many times over the centuries, positive evidence is most difficult to
uncover ...
(17) Probably this must have been done before, but I couldn’t find enough information
on this in the ISIS doc & ISIS/GIS community forums.
Co-occurrence with weaker epistemic modals and attitudes. (16) and (17) are
additionally interesting because they show must co-occuring with the (weaker?)
epistemic modals almost certainly and probably. I have found a number of such
examples, including cases involving the clearly weaker modals perhaps and maybe
and the attitude verb figure.
(18) [I]n fact, the words we hear as ‘pity’ can also be translated to mean that when
Jesus looked at the man, he ‘snorted like a war horse.’ Now that’s some kind
of anger. It’s deeply rooted, instinctive even. As perhaps it must have been.
(19) Last August, when they called me and asked whether I’d speak at The Global
Leadership Summit held by the Willow Creek Association, I thought maybe
there must have been a mix up.
(20) If the handgun was engraved or had some sort of fancier finish then I figured
he must be a “pistolero.” I might have been wrong but those were my initial
impressions.
The authors of (16)–(19) are clearly not, for example, attempting to express the claim
that the speaker {perhaps/maybe/ probably/almost certainly} has direct information
which entails the proposition embedded by must. After all, in (16) and (17) the
authors explicitly disavow possession of such evidence. The author of (20) even
follows I figured must p by acknowledging the possibility of error and his fragile
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epistemic basis for concluding p: “I might have been wrong, but those were my initial
impressions.” These examples cannot be treated as standard modal concord, which
is supposed to require strength matching, or as examples of vacuous quantification
by the modal with wider scope (Hacquard 2006; Yalcin 2007), since both modals
contribute elements of the interpretation.
In these examples the message is more along the lines of “I infer, with a degree
of confidence associated with {perhaps/maybe/probably/almost certainly/figure},
that p.” Must apparently retains its indirectness requirement, but cedes control over
doxastic strength to the other epistemic expression. While length restrictions prevent
me from attempting a detailed treatment of these interactions here, I believe that
the threshold-based semantics that I propose below can provide an account of such
interactions on the analogy of degree modification in expressions like somewhat
tall—more or less along the lines of the “modal modification” accounts of such
interactions explored by Grosz (2010); Anand & Brasoveanu (2010); Giannakidou
& Mari (To appear).
The relevance of statistical reasoning. Example (21)—pieced together from
messages and replies on the Ancestry.com message boards—illustrates the pos-
sible relevance of statistical reasoning to a speaker’s choice to employ must. The key
point is Author 1’s account in (21c) of his earlier choice to employ must: “I was only
assuming”, he explains, and then describes the reasoning behind his assumption.
(21) a. Author 1: [Y]our man Lazarus must have sustained injuries at [Buena
Vista] by his death date. ...
b. Author 2: I check the killed and wounded list for the Battle of Buena Vista
and Lazarus wasn’t listed under killed and wounded.
c. Author 1: Curious. I was only assuming that since Lazarus is listed as
dying on March 2, ’47, that it was from wounds suffered the week prior
(Buena Vista was fought Feb. 22-23). His unit (as with all volunteers at
the battle) was certainly in the thick of it. Nevertheless, as we all know,
disease took a heavier toll on the troops than actual enemy fire. In my
research, though, when I see a death date that close to the battle date, I
tend to think that wounds played apart.
Author 1’s choice to use must in (21a) is not well accounted for by supposing that
he thought he knew (directly or otherwise) that Lazarus had been wounded. After
all, he explains in (21c), “I was only assuming ...” and “I tend to think ... ”. In
addition, Author 1 is an expert on this domain—he mentions elsewhere that “I have
been researching the battle of Buena Vista for several years”—and he notes that “we
all know” that disease was the primary cause of death. It seems unlikely that this
author forgot that disease was a possible cause of death when formulating (21a).
13
Lassiter
The explanation continues with a description of implicit statistical reasoning:
• Most soldiers who died in the war died of disease: P(disease∣died) is high.
• Also, P(wounded∣died) is low: most who died had not been wounded.
• However, P(wounded∣battle&died) is high: Death within a week of battle
is usually attributable to battle wounds.
• Since Lazarus died within a week of battle, Lazarus must have been wounded.
Lacking more specific evidence regarding wounded when (21a) was formulated,
Author 1 chose must to mark wounded as the best explanation of the available
data.
4 Abductive and threshold semantics
I now propose a way of formalizing the kind of inference from indirect evidence
that vFG correctly identify as the core of must’s meaning, but doing it in a way
that is compatible with the Mantra and with the naturalistic examples of must that
were discussed above. Inference—including induction—is encoded in this model as
probabilistic reasoning. This model preserves much of vFG’s attractive account of
evidential meaning, but renders it compatible with the Mantra.
Note: I am not claiming that the account to follow is the only possible way to
explain the meaning and use of must. There are surely other possible theories of must
that encode an indirectness requirement and make room for induction. For example,
some variety of default logic (Reiter 1980) might be made to work. I focus on a
probabilistic account because I believe that it coheres best with cutting-edge work in
the semantics of epistemic modals and in the cognitive science of inference.6
4.1 Question-based probabilistic information dynamics
Probabilistic graphical models (PGMs) and their variants represent the state of
the art in representing and reasoning about uncertainty in AI and psychology.7 In
this approach, like other subjective-probability formalisms, information states are
6 On probability in the semantics of epistemic modals, see Yalcin 2005, 2007, 2010; Swanson 2006;
Lassiter 2010, 2011, 2014a, To appear, 2014b; Klecha 2012; Moss To appear. For a small sampling
of relevant research on inference in cognitive science, see footnote 7 and also Osherson et al. 1990;
Glymour 2001; Tenenbaum & Griffiths 2001; Tenenbaum, Griffiths & Kemp 2006; Oaksford &
Chater 2007; Kemp & Tenenbaum 2009; Lassiter & Goodman 2015.
7 Artificial Intelligence: Pearl 1988, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour & Scheines 1993; Koller & Friedman
2009; Russell & Norvig 2010, and many more. Psychology: Glymour 2001; Sloman 2005; Gopnik &
Schultz 2007; Danks 2014, and—with additions—Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths & Goodman 2011.
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represented using a set of epistemically possible worlds E together with a measure
function P which (a) takes propositions to [0,1], (b) assigns 1 to any tautology, and
(c) is additive—P(A∪B) = P(A)+P(B) if A∩B = ∅. Learning and inference are
modeled as conditionalization. If the probability distribution is P(⋅) and then B is
learned (P(B) ≠ 0), the distribution is updated to incorporate the information that B
is true. Afterwards, for any proposition C, P(C∣B) = P(B∧C)/P(B).
PGMs add structure to this basic picture in two ways. First, they contain a set of
“variables”, each of which partitions E . Formally, a variable is simply a Groenendijk
& Stokhof 1984 question denotation restricted to E (see van Rooij 2003).
(22) Definition (Variable/Question). A set of propositions (“answers”) s.t.
a. All answers in Q are subsets of E .
b. Any two distinct answers to Q are mutually exclusive.
c. Q covers E : one of the answers to Q must be true.
Second, PGMs add “arrows” representing dependencies between variables/questions.
If there is an arrow from Q1 to Q2, then Q1 and Q2 are dependent in the sense that
learning the value of one can influence the distribution on the other. Independent
variables have the inverse property: if Q1 and Q2 are independent then there is no an-
swer to Q1 which, if it were learned, would lead the learner to modify the probability
that she assigns to any answer to Q2 (and vice versa). (In)dependence assumptions
will not play a major role here, but they are critical for many applications.
Building on the PGMs framework, and with inspiration from recent formal
models of awareness (Franke & de Jager 2007; de Jager 2009; Yalcin 2011), I
assume that agents represent only some of the possible questions—that is, that they
are sensitive only to certain issues at a given time. Let the relevant set of questions
be V . As a set of question meanings, V is also a set of variables in the PGMs sense. I
assume further that V is partitioned into two sets: a set VD, the variables whose true
values have been observed directly, and VI = V −VD, whose values have not been
observed directly and must be inferred. This division is directly inspired by vFG’s
distinction between a “Kernel” K and a set of indirectly known propositions, but its
formal properties are significantly different.
Let Pm denote the relevant probability measure at time tm. Suppose that, at tn,
the answer to question Q is directly observed (and no other new information is
acquired). These conditions must hold at all times after tn:
• If Q is in VI at tn, it is in VD at tk for k > n.
• There is some answer q ∈Q such that Pk(q) = 1 for k > n.
• Suppose, after tn, no other question’s answer is directly observed until tp.
Then, for all tk such that tn < tk < tp, and for all Q′ ∈ V , Pk(Q′) = Pn(Q′∣Q).
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The first condition updates the direct/indirect division: when an agent observes the
answer to a question about which she has previously made only probabilistic infer-
ences, that question is registered thereafter as one whose answer has been directly
observed. The second requires that direct observation is uncertainty-free and that
observed answers are not forgotten. (These are helpful but not insignificant simplifi-
cations). For instance, if we are representing the question Is it raining at tm? and then
observe that it’s raining at tm, then P(rain-at-tm) = 1 for all times thereafter. The
third condition requires that information dynamics proceed exclusively by Bayesian
update on direct observations, ruling out non-Bayesian update and clairvoyance.
A further notable feature of the third condition is that, at any time tm, the
distribution Pm is equal to the initial distribution P updated by the values of all
directly observed variables: Pm(Q) = P(Q∣VD), where VD is the set of all questions
whose values have been observed up to time tm. Given this, we can simply write
P(⋅∣VD) for the relevant probability distribution at any time, letting the identity ofVD take care of the temporal bookkeeping.
4.2 Capturing must
Above we discussed a number of examples which presented difficulty for two planks
of vFG’s proposal: the claim that must p entails maximal speaker belief in the truth
of p, and the claim that it typically induces a maximal pragmatic commitment on
the part of speaker to the truth of p. I argued, essentially following Stone 1994, that
the effect of must in a variety of naturalistic examples would be better paraphrased
“p is the best explanation of the available evidence”.
With the PGM-based model just sketched in hand, it is straightforward to write
down a semantics for must which is closely related to vFG’s, but replaces their
“entailed by direct information” condition with a “best explanation” condition.
The definition assumes that assertions are required to address a Question Under
Discussion (QUD) which is determined by the discourse context (Ginzburg 1995a,b;
van Kuppevelt 1995; Roberts 2012; Beaver & Clark 2008). An assertion of must
q presupposes that q addresses the QUD Q—simplifying, that it is an element of
(direct answer to) Q. This is added to must’s presupposition that Q is not in VD.
(23) must q
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩is a presupposition failure if q ∉Q or Q ∈ VD;otherwise, is true iff ∀q′ ≠ q ∈Q ∶ P(q∣VD) > P(q′∣VD).
If we want to make must veridical we could add the truth of q as an additional
entailment. I do not know if this is the right choice empirically, but it seems to be
independent of the other details discussed here.
Bracketing the issue of veridicity, (23) effectively presents q as the answer to
question Q which has the highest probability because it best explains the observed
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evidence VD given the background assumptions encoded in P. As an example,
consider (4) again. Here the QUD might be ?q =Did Hartmann’s wife die before 1
Oct 1896?, a partition with two cells: {q,¬q}. Then the statement that the speaker
makes—must q—is predicted to be felicitous only if the speaker has not directly
observed either q or ¬q. Infelicity might result, for example, if the speaker had been
present at Hartmann’s wife’s death, or had received a reliable report from someone
who was, or had seen a death certificate. If felicitous, must q is true iff q is more
probable than ¬q, conditional on VD.
This is a decent rendition of what (4) conveys, though it seems too weak: we
should probably also require that p be much more likely than ¬p. But the problems
go deeper. If the QUD has many possible answers, the most likely could still be very
improbable. For example, the question On what day did Hartmann’s wife die? has
many possible answers, all of which might have very low probability. If q = She died
on day 1 Jan 1896 is the most likely, we do not necessarily want must q to come out
true for this reason: with thousands of possible answers, this condition could hold
even if has probability less than 1/1000. However, it seems clear that must q should
be false when P(q∣VD) is this low.
We can avoid this issue by strengthening the definition as follows: must q
requires that q is highly probable, which—as long as the required probability is at
least .5—entails that it is the most probable element of any partition that contains it.
(24) must q
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩is a presupposition failure if q ∉Q or Q ∈ VD;otherwise, is true iff P(q∣VD) > θmust.
With θmust ≥ .5, the definition in (24) is strictly stronger than the one in (23): it
requires that q be the best answer to the QUD, and—when the QUD is highly
ramified—the best by far. The definition still leaves much to be said, though: we
have not yet said anything about how uncertainty about θmust is resolved, or why it
should be ≥ .5.
Must is in pragmatic competition with a number of other items to describe
degrees of uncertainty or (in)directness of evidence. Many of these items are also
vague scalar expressions with context-sensitive meanings, such as (im)plausible,
(un)likely, (un)certain, (im)possible, and—I would argue—might. It is reasonable
to suppose that whatever pragmatic mechanisms go into estimating the vague and
context-sensitive threshold values for scalar adjectives—tall, short, heavy, warm,
hot, full, wet, etc.–are also recruited for the purpose of estimating the threshold
value that it implicated in must’s meaning. The closest analogue, on this way of
thinking, would be the choice between warm and hot to describe temperature. Even
though their interpretations vary greatly as a function of context and reference class,
lexical knowledge plays a partial role in fixing their thresholds: we know that the
minimum temperature required for something to be hot is greater than that required
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to be warm, rather than the reverse. In other words, even though the values of θwarm
and θhot are not fixed by our linguistic knowledge, the ordering θwarm < θhot is.
While epistemic expressions may have vague and context-sensitive meanings,
there are facts about their orderings that are similarly fixed lexically. For example, the
scalar epistemic adjectives probable and likely have context-sensitive meanings that
change with the distribution of probabilities among salient alternative sets (Teigen
1988; Windschitl & Wells 1998; Yalcin 2010; Lassiter 2011). In addition, a recent
experimental examination of epistemic readings of six adjectives found evidence for
the ordering possible < plausible < probable < likely < certain/necessary (Lassiter &
Goodman 2015) . The obvious way to enforce the ordering probable < likely is to
make θprobable < θlikely a lexical feature of these adjectives, analogous to θwarm < θhot.
This constraint will ensure that the two thresholds move in lockstep, regardless of the
mechanisms and information sources that are recruited to resolve the interpretation
further. We can constrain the interpretation of must similarly with a lexical ordering
relative to other epistemic expressions: for example, θmust is probably required to be
greater than θlikely. Perhaps it is also constrained to be less than θcertain.
While there is still much to be said about the way that speakers and listeners
narrow in on a more precise interpretation of must, the comparison with scalar
adjectives raises the hope that a theory of the threshold inference process for scalar
adjectives could simply be plugged in to derive reasonable results for must. See
Lassiter & Goodman 2013, To appear for a recent pragmatic theory of threshold
inference which is compatible with the present account.
5 Conclusion
The semantics of must is a rich topic with many connections to other epistemic items
and to philosophical and psychological theories of knowledge and inference. In this
brief paper I have only hinted at possible answers to many of the questions raised by
this item’s meaning and use. Some important topics for further research include
• a compositional semantics for must under attitude verbs like figure (20)
and in its co-occurrence with weaker epistemic items like almost certainly,
possibly, perhaps (16-19);
• the connection between must and knowledge: is there one? if so, does it
mean that knowledge is also “weak” in some sense?;
• empirical and computational investigation of the semantics and pragmatics
of vagueness in the meaning of must.
But we can’t do all of this here, so let’s close with the Mantra instead: “Must is
weak! Must is weak! Must is weak! Must is weak! Must is weak! Must is weak! ...”
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